Aptus Value Housing Finance India MD, chairman, board of directors and AGM

Mutual fund votes, meeting of 18 Feb 2026, 20 fund houses

• To Approve amendments to the Articles of Association of the Company

  ›Against Aditya Birla Sun Life Mutual Fund, Angel One Mutual Fund, Axis Mutual Fund, Bandhan Mutual Fund, Edelweiss Mutual Fund, Groww Mutual Fund, HDFC Mutual Fund, ICICI Prudential Mutual Fund, Jio BlackRock Mutual Fund, Kotak Mahindra Mutual Fund, Mirae Asset Mutual Fund, Motilal Oswal Mutual Fund, Navi Mutual Fund, Nippon India Mutual Fund, NJ Mutual Fund, quant Mutual Fund, SBI Mutual Fund, Zerodha Mutual Fund

  • Aditya Birla Sun Life Mutual Fund, Jio BlackRock Mutual Fund, SBI Mutual FundThe proposed amendments to the Articles seek to update the definition of “promoters” to reflect the company’s current promoters, M. Anandan and Ms. Padma Anandan. The company also proposes to delete the nomination rights of Westbridge—its erstwhile investor promoter—while retaining the nomination rights for its promoters, M. Anandan and Ms. Padma Anandan. In addition, the amendments introduce affirmative voting rights for the promoters on key matters and strategic decisions.The nomination rights granted to M. Anandan and Ms. Padma Anandan allow them to collectively nominate a majority of the board for as long as they are classified as promoters, irrespective of their shareholding. Therefore, even if the promoters’ shareholding reduces—whether through sale or dilution—they would continue to hold board nomination rights.We believe that board nomination rights should be linked to a shareholding threshold. In our view, such rights should be supported only when the promoters maintain a minimum shareholding of at least 10%. Further, the proposed amendments modify the board quorum requirements to mandate the presence of at least one promoter nominated director throughout the board meeting. We believe such quorum rights could be used as a tactic to delay or obstruct critical meetings. Given the above concerns, we do not support the resolution.
  • Angel One Mutual FundExcessive Rights vested on Promoters without linking it with a lower shareholding threshold.
  • Axis Mutual FundWe believe that board nomination rights should be linked to a shareholding threshold. In our view, such rights should be supported only when the promoters maintain a minimum threshold shareholding. Further, the proposed amendments modify the board quorum requirements to mandate the presence of at least one promoter nominated director throughout the board meeting which we believe could be disruptive for critical decision making in future meetings.
  • Bandhan Mutual Fund, Edelweiss Mutual Fund, Groww Mutual Fund, Motilal Oswal Mutual Fund, Navi Mutual Fund, Zerodha Mutual FundCompliant with law. Governance Concern: Power vested on Promoters to nominate majority of Directors on the Board without specifying a lower limit of their shareholding threshold. It will essentially provide the concerned Promoters to nominate majority of the Board with as little as 0.1% shareholding as well. Further, the Promoters are also vested with rights to decide / approve / decline any action which concerns the functioning of the Company, that too without specifying a lower shareholding threshold against which such rights may be granted. These rights will make shareholders’ approval a mere formality, and also materially dilute the role of Directors, who are responsible to take decisions on behalf of shareholders and put the Company’s interest first, independently.
  • HDFC Mutual FundThe nomination rights granted to M. Anandan and Ms. Padma Anandan allow them to collectively nominate a majority of the board for as long as they are classified as promoters, irrespective of their shareholding. Therefore, even if the promoters’ shareholding reduces—whether through sale or dilution—they would continue to hold board nomination rights. We do not support the resolution.
  • ICICI Prudential Mutual FundThe proposed amendments to the Articles are to update the definition of “promoters” to reflect the company’s current promoters, M. Anandan and Ms. Padma Anandan and delete nomination rights of Westbridge—its erstwhile investor promoter. In addition, the amendments introduce affirmative voting rights for the promoters on key matters and strategic decisions. The proposed amendments modify the board quorum requirements to mandate the presence of at least one promoter nominated director throughout the board meeting. Further, the Promoters are also vested with rights to ensure no action in respect of certain actions taken with respect to the Company can be taken without their consent. We believe that these rights can be prejudicial to the interests of non-promoter shareholders. Hence, we do not support the resolution.
  • Kotak Mahindra Mutual FundThe proposed amendments to the Articles seek to update the definition of promoters to reflect the company s current promoters, M. Anandan and Ms. Padma Anandan. The company also proposes to delete the nomination rights of Westbridge its erstwhile investor promoter while retaining the nomination rights for its promoters, M. Anandan and Ms. Padma Anandan. In addition, the amendments introduce affirmative voting rights for the promoters on key matters and strategic decisions. The nomination rights granted to M. Anandan and Ms. Padma Anandan allow them to collectively nominate a majority of the board for as long as they are classified as promoters, irrespective of their shareholding. Therefore, even if the promoters shareholding reduces whether through sale or dilution they would continue to hold board nomination rights. The Company is seeking approval for Nomination Rights in favour of the Promoters without linking it to any shareholding thresholds. Simply put, there is no lower shareholding cap up to which the concerned Promoters will be having such Nomination Rights. Further, the proposed amendments modify the board quorum requirements to mandate the presence of at least one promoter nominated director throughout the board meeting. Promoters are proposed to be granted such affirmative right, regardless of any lower shareholding threshold. Given the above concerns, we do not support the resolution.
  • Mirae Asset Mutual FundAs per advisory recommendation (Passive holding)
  • Nippon India Mutual FundGovernance Concern: Power vested on Promoters to nominate majority of Directors on the Board without specifying a lower limit of their shareholding threshold. It will essentially provide the concerned Promoters to nominate majority of the Board with as little as 0.1% shareholding as well. Further, the Promoters are also vested with rights to decide / approve / decline any action which concerns the functioning of the Company, that too without specifying a lower shareholding threshold against which such rights may be granted. These rights will make shareholders’ approval a mere formality, and also materially dilute the role of Directors, who are responsible to take decisions on behalf of shareholders and put the Company’s interest first, independently.
  • NJ Mutual FundThe proposed amendments to the Articles seek to update the definition of “promoters” to reflect the company’s current promoters, M. Anandan and Ms. Padma Anandan. The company also proposes to delete the nomination rights of Westbridge—its erstwhile investor promoter—while retaining the nomination rights for its promoters, M. Anandan and Ms. Padma Anandan. In addition, the amendments introduce affirmative voting rights for the promoters on key matters and strategic decisions. The nomination rights granted to M. Anandan and Ms. Padma Anandan allow them to collectively nominate a majority of the board for as long as they are classified as promoters, irrespective of their shareholding. Therefore, even if the promoters’ shareholding reduces—whether through sale or dilution—they would continue to hold board nomination rights. We believe that board nomination rights should be linked to a shareholding threshold. In our view, such rights should be supported only when the promoters maintain a minimum shareholding of at least 10%. Further, the proposed amendments modify the board quorum requirements to mandate the presence of at least one promoter nominated director throughout the board meeting. We believe such quorum rights could be used as a tactic to delay or obstruct critical meetings. Given the above concerns, we do not support the resolution.
  • quant Mutual FundPertaining to amendments to AoA. Compliant with the law. Governance concern: Power vested in promoters to nominate majority of the directors on the Board without specifying a limit of their shareholding threshold, which provides promoters the ability to nominate majority of the Board with as little as 0.1% shareholding. Further, the promoters are also vested with rights to decide/ approve/ decline any action which concerns the functioning of the company, that too without specifying a shareholding threshold against which such rights may be granted. Hence, we are voting against the resolution

  2 for18 against

Mutual fund votes, meeting of 21 Aug 2025, 19 fund houses

• Adoption of financial statements

  19 for0 against
• Appointment of Mr. K.P. Balaraj as Director, liable to retire by rotation

  19 for0 against
• To appoint the Secretarial Auditors of the Company

  19 for0 against
• To approve the increase in borrowing powers in excess of the paid-up share capital, free reserves and securities premium of the Company pursuant to Section 180(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013

  19 for0 against
• To approve creation of charges on the assets of the Company under Section 180(1)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013 to secure the borrowings made/to be made under section 180(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013.MoreLess

  19 for0 against
• To approve the issue of Non-Convertible Debentures, in one or more tranches on private placement basis

  19 for0 against

Mutual fund votes, meeting of 25 Apr 2025, 15 fund houses

• To appoint Mr.Subba Rao N.V (DIN: 05153667)as an Independent Director of the Company

  15 for0 against

Mutual fund votes, meeting of 8 Mar 2025, 14 fund houses

• Appointment of Mr. Anand Raghavan (DIN: 00243485) as an Independent Director of the Company

  ›Against Bandhan Mutual Fund, Edelweiss Mutual Fund, Groww Mutual Fund, Kotak Mahindra Mutual Fund, Motilal Oswal Mutual Fund, Nippon India Mutual Fund, PGIM India Mutual Fund

  • Bandhan Mutual Fund, Edelweiss Mutual Fund, Groww Mutual Fund, Motilal Oswal Mutual Fund, PGIM India Mutual FundAppointment compliant with law. Governance Concern: Combined position of AC & NRC Chairperson, Appointee holds directorship positions in entities that are engaged similar line of business.
  • Kotak Mahindra Mutual FundWe believe appointment of Mr. Raghavan while it is legally compliant, doesn t bode well from governance perspective. He currently chairs two important committees Audit and Nomination & Remuneration Committee. While it is desirable that the company has two separate directors chairing these important committees, we believe given his expertise on the subject matter and experience, we believe he might be able to discharge his responsibilities in the relevant position. However, he also hold directorship on the board of a competing NBFC (engaged in similar line of business) and we believe that is a bigger governance issue. Hence we should vote AGAINST.
  • Nippon India Mutual FundProfile of the Candidate

  7 for7 against
• Appointment of Mr. Natarajan Ramasubramanian (DIN: 10887970) as an Independent Director of the Company

  14 for0 against

Mutual fund votes, meeting of 6 Sep 2024, 11 fund houses

• Re-appointment of Mr. M Anandan (DIN: 00033633), as the Executive Chairman of the Company

  ›Against Aditya Birla Sun Life Mutual Fund, Axis Mutual Fund, Bandhan Mutual Fund, Groww Mutual Fund, Motilal Oswal Mutual Fund, Nippon India Mutual Fund, PGIM India Mutual Fund

  • Aditya Birla Sun Life Mutual Fund, Axis Mutual FundM Anandan received Rs. 149.2 mn as remuneration in FY24, which was 428.0x of the median employee remuneration. We estimate his annual remuneration at Rs. 180.0 mn for FY25. While we support M Anandan’s reappointment as Executive Chairperson, we do not support the resolution because the estimated remuneration is not commensurate with the size and complexity of the business and high when compared to peers. The company should have disclosed granular details including company performance targets which govern his variable pay. M Anandan is a member of the Nomination and Remuneration committee, which represents a conflict of interest. The remuneration is also being set as minimum remuneration in case of inadequate profits; therefore, remuneration may continue to be high even in years of poor company performance. We do not support the resolution.
  • Bandhan Mutual Fund, Groww Mutual Fund, Motilal Oswal Mutual Fund, Nippon India Mutual Fund, PGIM India Mutual FundNon-Compliance with Section 196(3)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013 - No specific approval of shareholders for continuation beyond 70 years of age and no specific justification for continuation. Governance concern: Excessive Remuneration, Concentration of power in the hand of Mr. M. Anandan

  4 for7 against

Mutual fund votes, meeting of 14 Aug 2024, 11 fund houses

Each resolution counts the houses whose vote was matched to it; the rest are listed last.

• Adoption of financial statements

  11 for0 against
• Appointment of Mr. Sumir Chadha as Director, liable to retire by rotation

  11 for0 against
• Appointment of M/s. Sundaram & Srinivasan, Chartered Accountants as Statutory Auditors.

  ›Against Bandhan Mutual Fund, Groww Mutual Fund, Motilal Oswal Mutual Fund, Nippon India Mutual Fund, PGIM India Mutual Fund

  • Bandhan Mutual Fund, Groww Mutual Fund, Motilal Oswal Mutual Fund, Nippon India Mutual Fund, PGIM India Mutual FundNo concern on the merit of proposed Auditor. Non-Compliant with SEBI LODR Regulation: Proposed remuneration of statutory auditors not disclosed.

  6 for5 against
• Fixing of Borrowing Limits

  2 for0 against
• Creation of Charge / Mortgage on Assets

  11 for0 against
• Offer / invitation to subscribe to Non-Convertible Debentures on privatenplacement basisn

  2 for0 against